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Abstract
In this critical essay, I contend that accelerating demands for novel theories in 
management studies imply that new methodologies and data are sometimes accepted 
prematurely as supply of these novel theories. This point is illustrated with reference to 
how neuroscience can inform management research. I propose two demand forces that 
foster the increased focus on neuroscience in management studies, these being (i) the 
direction of public research funding, and (ii) publication bias as a boost for journal impact 
factor. Looking at the supply side, I note that (i) the statistical power of studies using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (or fMRI, the ‘gold’ standard) is unacceptably 
low, (ii) the use of imprecise ‘motherhood’ statements, and (iii) the dismissal of 
ethical concerns in the formulation of management theories and practice informed 
by neuroscience. I then briefly outline the bad consequences of this for management 
theory and practice, emphasize why it is important to prevent these consequences, and 
offer some methodological suggestions for future research.
Keywords
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Introduction
Ongoing debates within Human Relations and beyond reflect a keen interest among 
management scholars in the future of theory building (e.g. Cornelissen and Durand, 
2014; Healey and Hodgkinson, 2014; Lindebaum and Jordan, 2014b). Recently, how-
ever, some scholars have expressed concern about the current state of building theories 
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in the management literature, thereby indirectly increasing demands for novel theories. 
Writing in Academy of Management Review, for instance, Devers and colleagues (2014: 
248) suggest that ‘we appear to be moving toward a future where theory is of less impor-
tance’. In a similar vein, Alvesson and Sandberg (2013: 128), writing in the Journal of 
Management Studies, lament that there is a ‘troubling shortage of novel ideas . . . within 
management studies’. Suddaby and colleagues (2011) would concur that this dearth of 
novel theory affects management research more broadly speaking. For instance, they 
argue that the simplicity and static nature of extant management theories implies that 
dynamic changes in the complexity and size of modern organizations are difficult to 
capture.1 From a theoretical perspective, I agree that this simplicity and static nature can 
pose challenges, for instance, when we fail to better understand ever more dynamic and 
frequently changing organization–employee relationships (in neglected areas such as 
multiple jobholding, see Sliter and Boyd, 2014), or in terms of not fully understanding 
within-leader behavior variance in relation to situationally appropriate leadership (Jordan 
and Lindebaum, in press).
Owing to the influential standing of the journals that published the articles by Devers 
et al. (2014) and Alvesson and Sandberg (2013), it is plausible to suggest that their arti-
cles calling for novel management theories and ideas can create a certain demand whose 
supply is not (yet) met. This directly relates to the motivation of this essay; that is, when 
perceptions of the demand side reach a given magnitude, it can potentially create an 
atmosphere where new theory – especially when based upon novel yet problematic data 
– may be accepted too readily in order to ensure the necessary supply to meet this 
demand. For some scholars, this lies at the heart of the scientific project: that is, ‘social 
scientists . . . will naturally want to underpin [i.e. supply] their theories with more empiri-
cal data’ (Runkel and Runkel, 1984: 130).
For illustration, I discuss how neuroscience, particularly functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging data (fMRI, the ‘gold standard’ of neuroimaging techniques, see Cui 
et al., 2011), can inform management studies. The combination of these two disciplines 
has given rise to the new domain of organizational neuroscience, briefly defined as ‘a 
deliberate and judicious approach to spanning the divide between neuroscience and 
organizational science’ (Becker and Cropanzano, 2010: 1055). However, I speculate that 
the case of neuroscience may merely be indicative of a larger phenomenon in social sci-
ence, where sometimes demands for theoretical advances influence theory-building 
efforts that, over the years, are increasingly questioned by empirical findings (i.e. the 
supply). This very development can also be observed in the literature on boundaryless 
careers (see Rodrigues and Guest, 2010).
Before I proceed, I would like to briefly offer four important clarifications. First, 
while Kanter (2005) focuses upon the ‘demand’ side of ‘bad theories’, Ghoshal (2005) 
focuses upon the ‘supply’ side of it. However, I appreciate both demand and supply 
forces in relation to novel theories in management studies that are informed by neurosci-
ence. For organizing purposes, I treat demand and supply as distinct forces, whilst not 
neglecting their cyclical interaction (Kanter, 2005).
Second, consistent with previous writers on the topic (Ghoshal, 2005; Kanter, 2005), 
I employ the terms ‘demand and supply’ in this essay. However, instead of a perhaps 
more restrictive economic interpretation of these terms, the reader will encounter several 
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occasions where I (or indeed others) are explicit in recognizing ‘agency’ aspects of 
researchers’ activities.
Third, it is germane to indicate what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ management theory in 
the context of this essay. Precisely, I adopt an ‘industry’ standard of how theory can be 
defined, namely, as a ‘system of constructs . . . in which the constructs are related to each 
other by propositions’ (Bacharach, 1989: 498). While perspectives can differ on what 
constitutes theory (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995; Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010), 
adopting the above-mentioned definition helps demonstrate that, in terms of supply, neu-
roscience often struggles to measure up to this standard (i.e. owing to the operationaliza-
tion of ‘constructs’ based upon problematic data). At the same time, it remains popular 
for demand-related reasons. In addition, what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ management 
theory raises ethical aspects too, especially when these aspects matter little in the formu-
lation of management theory as espoused by empiricists or rationalists. Thus, I concur 
with Suddaby’s (2014) exegesis of normative theories to indicate what ‘good’ theory 
might look like. Here, ethics and values of actors are appreciated in management theories 
as an engine that constructs reality, rather than a camera that captures it (MacKenzie, 
2006). This differentiates normative theorists sharply from empiricists and rationalists, 
the latter two harbouring the assumption of an ‘objective distance between research and 
practice and who believe that their research is largely free of political and moral assump-
tions’ (Suddaby, 2014: 2). Interestingly, Suddaby (2014: 2) adds that normative theorists 
oftentimes ‘contradict the (often dismal) view of the world given to us by both empiri-
cists and rationalists’. This clarification has particular bearings on the discussion on the 
dismissal of ethical concerns in the formulation of new theories in management (i.e. as 
part of the discussion on the supply side).
Fourth, I disagree with the contemporary advocacy of neuroscience in management 
studies (e.g. Becker et al., 2011; Senior et al., 2011; Waldman et al., 2011) for a number 
of ethical, logical and empirical reasons (as detailed in Lindebaum and Jordan, 2014a; 
Lindebaum and Zundel, 2013). At the same time, I am heartened that more balanced 
(and sometimes sceptical) views on the merit of non-clinical applications of neurosci-
ence in management are emerging (Tracey and Schluppeck, 2014), or sociological 
inquiries on what kinds of issues arise as neuroscientific data is produced (Pickersgill, 
2013). However, compared with the main thrust of advocating articles, these studies 
pale in numbers.
In the remainder of this essay, I first identify further demand forces closely linked to 
the domain of organizational neuroscience in addition to general demands for novel 
management theory already detailed. These forces are described in terms (i) direction of 
public research funding, and (ii) presence of publication bias to boost journal impact fac-
tors. Second, I underscore that the supply side of management theories currently informed 
by neuroscientific methods and data (especially fMRI data) is affected by (i) the usage of 
invalid data/discrepant analytical strategies, (ii) imprecise theoretical statements, and 
(iii) a dismissal of ethical concerns in the formulation of theories and practice in manage-
ment. The way that research institutions, funding organizations and individual scholars 
help produce and reproduce these demand and supply forces then leads to the emergence 
of ‘bad’ consequences for management theory and practice (e.g. when it is assumed that 
method X is the most effective tool to recruit key personnel when, in fact, it is not). In 
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light of these persisting problems, I close this essay by offering some suggestions for 
future research to help limit the bad consequences for management practice already men-
tioned above.
Characteristics of the demand side
The question as to why there is such a receptive audience in relation to neuroscientific 
theories and methods as a conduit to inform new management research is a relevant and 
under-explored one. In this essay, I argue that there are at least two relevant demand 
factors.
First, if Duster (2006: 1) is correct, public funding to support key research priorities 
is increasingly channeled toward ‘reductionist science for which partial evidence is 
found in the strikingly imbalanced allocation of research funding for “causes” of wide-
ranging problems’ and an ‘expansion of databases on markers and processes “inside the 
body”’. Consistent with this, several neuroscientific advocates in management studies 
have proclaimed ‘a biological turn in order to understand the underlying processes con-
cerning markets and organizations’ (Butler, 2014: 720) or desire for a ‘more biologically 
informed view of business and organizations’ (Senior et al., 2011: 813). Empirical stud-
ies reflecting these sentiments have already been published, such as genetic and neuro-
logical foundations of customer orientation (Bagozzi et al., 2012) or the quest for a 
leadership ‘gene’ (while not neglecting environmental factors, see De Neve et al., 2013).
Further indicators of this trend emerge from President Obama’s Brain Initiative 
announced in April 2013, which allocated $100m worth of research funding to five fed-
eral research agencies (White House, 2014), with contributions from commercial organi-
zations, universities or foundations exceeding Obama’s pledge significantly. Likewise, 
the EU-funded flagship project the Human Brain Project has secured funding in excess 
of €1b in 20132 in order to develop the necessary technology to create a computer simu-
lation of the brain. At around the same time in the USA, funding for the Humanities 
seems to have decreased progressively since 2009, and in 2011, it amounted to less than 
0.5 percent compared with grants dedicated to science and engineering research and 
development (Delany, 2013). It is for this reason that the availability of funding can be 
seen as a legitimate demand force that exercises influence over which research projects 
are funded. As Waldman (2013: 2) notes, it is his ‘experience that grant agencies and 
foundations increasingly seek interdisciplinary research proposals that involve co-inves-
tigators from diverse backgrounds [including neuroscience]’. Of note, in the realm of 
neuroscientific leadership studies, the first studies funded by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (or DARPA – one of the five federal research agencies men-
tioned earlier within Obama’s Brain Initiative) have been published (e.g. Balthazard 
et al., 2012; Hannah et al., 2013). In light of the research priorities (and associated fund-
ing flows) of major funding organizations, it is likely that neuroscience (more generally 
and in the context of management studies), will remain on the research agenda for some 
time. Two points are worth highlighting here. On the one hand, in the context of clinical 
applications, it is clear that appropriate funding levels are of vital importance. On the 
other hand, there might be a temptation to categorize neuroscience as yet another man-
agement fad, but this view has been challenged (Lindebaum, 2013b).
 at University of Liverpool on September 15, 2015hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Lindebaum 5
Second, publication bias as a boost for journal impact factor is likely to play a role in 
creating a demand for novel theories, and the case of neuroscience is a prominent exam-
ple. For instance, I recently provided a count of 15 to 0 in favor of neuroscientific advo-
cates in management studies in relation to publications in leading US journals (Lindebaum, 
2014). Adding recent publications (of which I am aware, see Ashkanasy et al., 2014; 
Lindebaum and Jordan, 2014a; Molenberghs et al., 2015), the score has changed to 17 to 
1. Indeed, the count would also appear differently if high-quality European journals or 
journals of highly respectable but lower impact factors are included as well.3 Further to 
this, when advocating articles on organizational neuroscience are fast-tracked in prestig-
ious journals despite years of backlog articles (e.g. an article appearing ‘on-line’ first in 
March of a given year, and then included in the April issue of the same year), it raises the 
question for me as to whether publication bias does not play a role here.
A closer look at the clinical literature further helps illuminate the link between publi-
cation bias and a journal’s impact factor. For instance, Dubben and Beck-Bornholdt 
(2005) argue that positive findings stand a better chance of being published, being pub-
lished earlier, and being published in journals with higher impact factors (with the con-
comitant risk that conclusions can be misleading: this is especially the case for 
neuroscience, see Button et al., 2013). The former editor of the British Medical Journal, 
Richard Smith (2015), agrees, positing that ‘“top journals” select studies that are new 
and sexy rather than reliable’. However, given the competition among journals for pro-
fessional prestige, being frequently read and noticed as indicated in a higher impact fac-
tor is crucial for the journal, as publishers and advertisers tend to support financially a 
high-impact journal more compared with a journal with a waning impact factor (Joober 
et al., 2012). Therefore, articles presenting positive and clean results, or those that repre-
sent novel and attractive topics, are more likely to get published, not least because it will 
help boost the journal’s impact factor. This argument is also reflected in the recent meta-
analysis on fMRI data by Button and colleagues (2013). Given the crucial implications 
for career progression, promotion and kudos of where we publish (as opposed to what we 
say), social science runs the risk of becoming ever more normative in the topics it 
addresses, and the way we engage with these topics (either as advocates or dissenters – 
see Duster, 2006; Holt and den Hond, 2013).
Taken together, I argue that there are note-worthy demand forces for management 
research informed by neuroscientific theories and methods. However, as I will detail 
hereafter, there are lingering issues with the quality of the supply and its appeal.
Characteristics of the supply side
When it comes to the supply of novel management theories informed by neuroscientific 
data, there are several characteristics that are worth highlighting. As indicated, the first 
concern is related to the validity of fMRI data. A second concern pertains to the use of 
imprecise motherhood statements. And third, I discuss the supply of ethically devoid theo-
retical and empirical advances mirroring the ‘pretense of knowledge’ (Ghoshal, 2005).
By all accounts, the use of fMRI data is becoming more widespread in management 
research broadly defined (e.g. Bagozzi et al., 2012, 2013; Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2014; 
Molenberghs et al., 2015), largely because it offers management scholars the confidence 
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to rely upon ‘hard’ and ‘objective’ data, which is said to reduce the error margins and 
levels of ambiguity to be found in more traditional research design (Lindebaum and 
Jordan, 2014a). More precisely, the putative rigor is attained by virtue of neuroimaging 
techniques avoiding reliance upon individuals’ self-reports, since they measure all brain 
processes, whether they are conscious or unconscious (Becker et al., 2011). Therefore, 
neuroscientific imaging technologies capture both ‘controlled’ and ‘automatic’ processes 
of social cognition (Lieberman, 2007). In consequence, neuroscience offers the promise 
to make visible what has been hidden, insofar as unconscious processes can be readily 
made evident in ways that normally eludes traditional modes of data collection (Becker 
et al., 2011).
As one of many recent examples, consider the fMRI study on ‘Machiavellianism’ and 
‘mentalizing’ by Bagozzi and colleagues (2013). The authors invoke prior research sug-
gesting that ‘mentalizing’ (i.e. ‘the ability to read the desires, intentions, and beliefs of 
other people’, see Frith and Frith, 2008: 504) is located in several specific brain regions. 
Bagozzi and colleagues (2013) refer to four studies to cement their argument. Of these 
four studies, three are review articles, and only one study is based upon empirical fMRI 
data (with a sample size of 12 individuals, see Saxe and Wexler, 2005).
While my intention here is not to call into question the quality of theorizing in the 
Bagozzi et al. (2013) study, a recent meta-analysis published in Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience offers a cautionary tale on the interpretation of fMRI data. Specifically, it 
reports that the estimated statistical power of fMRI studies using human subjects is only 
8 percent, owing to small sample sizes and inconsistent analytical strategies (Button 
et al., 2013). That is, if a study were to be designed with a power of 8 percent, it entails 
that – if there were 100 genuine non-null effects to be detected, this study can only be 
expected to detect eight of them (Button et al., 2013). Statistical conventions typically 
locate the requisite statistical power at .8 (and not .08, see Funder et al., 2014). This, in 
turn, has significant consequences for the advancement of theory in management research 
and beyond. Recall how theory was defined previously in this essay, namely, as an 
arrangement of constructs in which these constructs are associated by way of proposi-
tions. Put differently, proposing a complete theory requires the identification of which 
factors (e.g. constructs, variables or concepts) are logical constituents of the explanation 
of the phenomenon under investigation (Whetten, 1989). Therefore, given the low statis-
tical power of fMRI studies, how can we be sure to a sufficient degree that the relating 
of mental phenomena (e.g. mentalizing, attitudes, cognition or emotions) to specific 
brain regions via specific propositions is based upon a true effect reported previously?
A second characteristic of the supply side can be found in the use of so-called ‘moth-
erhood statements’. That is, statements that lack clear conceptual and theoretical direc-
tions enabling a better understanding of how precisely brain networks account for (and 
are influenced by) behaviors that have practical relevance in the context of work. 
Lindebaum and Jordan (2014a) refer to the evident use of these statements in advocating 
research on organizational neuroscience. For instance, Goleman and Boyatzis (2008: 2) 
maintain that, 
. . .great leaders are those whose behaviour powerfully leverages the system of brain inter-
connectedness . . . If we are correct, it follows that a potent way of becoming a better leader is 
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to find authentic contexts in which to learn the kinds of social behavior that reinforce the brain’s 
social circuitry. 
Another example is provided by the Chartered Institute for Professional Development 
(or CIPD, 2014), when they suggest ‘how HR [Human Resources] can use neuroscience 
to boost learning and development, cut staff turnover and enhance customer service’, 
adding that one way to achieve this is to help ‘staff to gain knowledge of how the brain 
is structured [which] can help learners build self-awareness and improve their personal 
effectiveness’. This is a prominent motherhood statement, and its validity is questiona-
ble; as if structural knowledge of the brain alone – without any deeper understanding of 
how the brain holistically functions – could ever explain such complex issues such as 
self-awareness or effectiveness in the context of a particular work setting or situation 
(Lindebaum and Jordan, 2014a; Lindebaum and Zundel, 2013).4
Third, and consistent with the pretense of knowledge, it is evident that organizational 
neuroscience is firmly embedded within the positivist paradigm (for an exception, see 
Healey and Hodgkinson, 2014), with its ontological and epistemological key tenets of 
reality as real and apprehensible as well as findings being objectively true, respectively 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). As an example to this end, consider Becker and colleagues 
(2011), who argue that ‘neural mechanisms are largely homogenous across all individu-
als’ and that ‘all brains are organized in a similar fashion’ (p. 936).5
The positivist ideal is also captured in Ghoshal’s (2005) cautionary essay on bad man-
agement theories. For him, the pretense of knowledge results from a ‘partialization of 
analysis, the exclusion of any role of for human intentionality or choice, and the use of 
sharp assumptions and deductive reasoning’ (pp. 76–77). For the pretense of knowledge 
to gain legitimacy in management studies and beyond, theorizing must be value-free and, 
worse still, involves a dismissal of ethical concerns (see also Suddaby, 2014). This is 
especially apparent in the application of neuroscience for enhancement purposes rather 
than clinical or therapeutic purposes (as an example of this, see Waldman et al., 2011). In 
addition, many ethical problems, such as those of potentially harmful management prac-
tices, are the direct consequence of methodological problems (Lindebaum and Jordan, 
2014a; Lindebaum and Raftopoulou, 2015). This, in turn, suggests that grounding ques-
tions philosophically and ethically is of great significance in management studies. But 
advocates of organizational neuroscience seem unimpressed by these concerns. As one 
advocate of neuroscience once wrote to me, it is more an empirical – rather than an ethi-
cal or philosophical – question as to whether individuals participating in studies using 
neuroscientific methods feel any discomfort about this kind of data collection. I disagree 
with this view. Grounding questions philosophically and ethically is of great significance 
in social science research, for otherwise empirical efforts are ‘understood to solidify and 
legitimize existing dogmas and prejudice’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992: 435). Like oth-
ers (e.g. Hallinan et al., 2014), I have detailed previously why ethical concerns do arise 
in the context of applying neuroscientific methods to the study of management phenom-
ena (Lindebaum, 2013b).
Perhaps even more noteworthy is that neuroscientists themselves (see e.g. Farah, 
2005; Farah et al., 2008; Fuchs, 2006; Ilieva et al., 2015) – as well as philosophers and 
historians (Harari, 2014; Levy, 2009) – have advanced the debate on the ethics of 
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neuroscience (or bio-technology more generally) much further than those who import it 
into management studies. Recently, I wrote an article (and rejoinder, see Lindebaum, 
2013a, 2013b) on the effects of pathologizing healthy but ineffective leaders owing to 
their ‘brain profile deficiencies’ (a label used by Waldman et al., 2011). That is, only 
because a brain profile of an arbitrarily selected category of effective leadership (i.e. 
inspirational leadership, see Waldman et al., 2011) was not detected in some participants 
(i.e. those with ‘anger management problems’), these participants underwent a series of 
neuro-feedback sessions to become more inspirational (and, therefore, more effective). 
To the best of my knowledge, there is little – if any – deeper conversation about the ethics 
of neuroscience as such among advocates of organizational neuroscience, especially if 
neuroscience is applied to emotional or cognitive enhancing in healthy individuals rather 
than clinical purposes. It should be added, however, that Waldman and colleagues (2011) 
caution against the use of neuroscience to boost the ‘darker side’ of leadership, such as 
manipulative skills. Of course, that might just as well be achieved by watching Kevin 
Spacey depicting Frank Underwood in House of Cards.
Bad consequences for management practice
Based upon the preceding sections, I discern the danger that we create bad rather than 
good theory. However, beyond offering incomplete or ill-guided direction for future 
empirical efforts, it has also significant consequences for management practice, espe-
cially when ineffective management practice (e.g. in terms of selecting key-decision 
makers) is considered effective. As McDaniel and colleagues (2006) show in the con-
text of employment interviews, prior meta-analyses have shown that structured inter-
views had a higher validity than unstructured interviews (.27 versus .19, uncorrected). 
However, they also discuss subsequent studies on publication bias suggesting that the 
validity of structured interviews is likely to be lower (i.e. .21), placing it in close prox-
imity to the validity of unstructured interviews. For McDaniel and colleagues (2006), 
one key consequence of this has been that many practitioners have invested considera-
ble efforts to create rather laborious structured interviews in order to select employees, 
assuming that these had a higher validity compared with unstructured interviews. With 
the alleged ‘objective’ and ‘rigorous’ nature of neuroscientific data, it is not hard to 
imagine that future employee selection processes will harness expensive fMRI technol-
ogy to ensure the ‘best’ candidates are hired for the job. First studies following the logic 
of ‘objective’ and ‘rigorous’ data are already emerging (see e.g. Waldman et al., 2011). 
However, pointing to the ethical problems arising from low statistical power of fMRI 
studies, Button and colleagues (2013: 365) conclude that ‘unreliable research is ineffi-
cient and wasteful’. Therefore, like others, I argue that (at least for now) we should not 
be ‘blinded by neuroscience’ (Wastell and White, 2012: 399), even though the advocacy 
of applying neuroscientific theories and methods is sharply increasing as demonstrated 
by the growing number of publications in top-tier North-American management jour-
nals (Lindebaum, 2014).
It follows that there is an imperative to ensure that the new theories we plausibly seek 
to generate should be based upon valid and strong data in order to prevent any negative 
ramifications for management theory and practice. By extension, theories are required to 
 at University of Liverpool on September 15, 2015hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Lindebaum 9
possess a wider theoretical grasp of phenomena under examination and their practical 
relevance (Edwards, under review) in order to generate, for instance, a better understand-
ing of social relations in and around work (Edwards, 2011).
Some suggestions for future research
The question then arises what scholars can do en route to developing new and strong man-
agement theory informed by neuroscience? In this regard, I advocate direct replication, 
coupled with an increase in sample sizes, in order to augment the statistical power of these 
studies. Direct replication refers to the repetition of an experimental procedure to as precise 
a degree as is feasible (i.e. using identical equipment, material, stimuli, design and statisti-
cal analysis where possible) to attain more confirmatory power compared with conceptual 
replication. The latter refers to the application of different methods or parameters (e.g. dif-
ferent questionnaires to examine transformational leadership) to repeat tests for specific 
hypotheses or experiments (see Schmidt, 2009, for a review on the difference between 
direct and conceptual replication). However, direct replication appears crucial in the con-
text of neuroscientific studies and, by extension, for management studies drawing upon this 
empirical body in order to advance knowledge. This is because a recent study demonstrates 
significant inconsistencies in terms of analytical strategies. Precisely, Carp (2012) reports 
that, of 241 fMRI studies examined, 223 unique analytical strategies were employed, so 
that almost no analysis was used more than once. Relevant factors here concern definitions 
of key variables, the statistical model employed, adjustments undertaken (or lack thereof) 
to account for potentially confounding factors, and the usage of filters to exclude some 
observations from the analysis. Particularly in small sample studies, this can generate dif-
ferent estimates of an effect size depending upon the analytical choices made. Even minor 
adjustments can readily render a non-significant result significant (Button et al., 2013). 
Therefore, I concur with Funder and colleagues (2014), who stress that reproducibility of 
findings helps establish a firm bedrock upon which reliable findings can accumulate.
Conclusion
In sum, I reiterate that previous contributions on the generation of management theory 
offer an important analysis that hopefully will spark some imagination among manage-
ment scholars and beyond in terms of building new theories. With this essay, however, I 
aimed to add an important twist to their call, namely, that when a certain demand for new 
theory is plausibly created, that we should be wary not to rush these efforts by taking 
recourse to kinds of data that require further elaboration and development. In this essay, 
I have examined both demand and supply forces in relation to novel theories in manage-
ment studies informed by neuroscience (including an appreciation of ‘agency’ aspects of 
researchers’ activities). I have shown that the magnitude of the demand is not always met 
by a corresponding supply of quality data, theoretical precision and an appreciation of 
harm that the pretense of knowledge can impose upon management practice. Taken 
together, the more technical aspects of building theories (i.e. especially the kinds of 
ingredients we use) combine with a dismissal of ethical concerns as a harbinger of bad 
management theory and practice.
 at University of Liverpool on September 15, 2015hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
10 Human Relations 
I close this essay by paraphrasing Lewin’s (1945: 127) famous statement that ‘nothing 
is as practical as a good theory’ to read that nothing is as impractical as a bad theory.6 I 
hope this critical essay has contributed a little to the quest for good theories, which, as 
Kanter (2005) reminds us, will emerge if we actually demand them. Thus, our efforts to 
generate new and good management theory must be carefully gauged against the danger 
of generating bad theory based upon data that requires further development.
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Notes
1 Suddaby and colleagues (2014) also note that the discipline of ‘management research 
has failed to cultivate any truly indigenous theories of management’ (p. 236, emphasis 
added). This, in turn, relates to the perennial debate on whether – in broader management 
research or specific subsets thereof – it is wiser and more appropriate to speak of theories 
in management rather than theories of management, for management theories cannot be 
treated as self-contained spheres of social life given their interface with, inter alia, bio-
logical, political, economical or social factors (see e.g. Hyman, 2004). Consistent with 
the definition of organizational neuroscience provided, I interpret the attempt to draw 
upon neuroscientific theories and data as an effort to create new theories in rather than of 
management.
2 The information has been retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-24428162 and https://
www.humanbrainproject.eu/documents/10180/17648/TheHBPReport_LR.pdf/18e5747e-10af-
4bec-9806-d03aead57655 on 20 March 2015.
3 Note that I do not equate a journal’s impact factor with the quality of research published 
therein, since the impact factor is determined by technicalities independent of the quality of 
scientific articles (Seglen, 1997). In addition, I construe a high impact factor as an indicator 
of article appeal to a broad mainstream readership (unless an article is cited for poor scholar-
ship). It often does not entail that marginalized and dissenting contributions to the literature 
are of any lower quality.
4 These statements also compel the reader to consider the metaphorical versus literal use of 
neuroscience as a resource in management studies. It appears to me that there is a connec-
tion between these motherhood statements and the more metaphorical use of neuroscience, 
reflecting a loose reliance on analogy and pseudo-science (Wastell, 2013). Several examples 
of motherhood statements and the more metaphorical use of neuroscience can be found in 
Jarrett (2015). However, more literal interpretations are also evident in advocating scien-
tific literature on organizational neuroscience, reflecting the assumption that the logics and 
mechanism operating at one level of analysis (i.e. neural activity) hold and operate in identi-
cal ways at higher-levels of analysis too (e.g. the organizational level – for a critique on this 
argument, see Lindebaum and Zundel, 2013).
5 And yet, it is fallacious to assume that only because neural mechanisms and brains work 
in similar ways across humans, that the phenomenological outcomes are identical too. This 
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is part and parcel of the multiple realizations phenomenon in the philosophy of science 
(Lindebaum and Zundel, 2013).
6 I gratefully acknowledge a previous conversation with Roy Suddaby, who suggested this 
paraphrased statement to me at the EGOS Conference 2013 in Montreal.
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